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The Florida courts are to be commended for the sound approach
employed in substantially all cases involving trusts and succession decided
during the period under survey. The courts appear to have been motivated
by a strong desire to administer understandable justice and refused to be
impeded by form, orthodox views or over aged common law concepts.
In one case,1 flexibility was reserved for the pu*rpose of granting relief in
future cases of fraud or unjust enrichment. In another,2 the common law in
existence on July 4, 1776 and made a part of ours by statute3 was discarded
for a more modern view in keeping with our society. In still another case,4
a majority view was discarded for a modern ruling devoid of speculation
and exceptions. Thanks to the Florida Supreme Court, the distinction
between resulting and constructive trusts was made understandably known.
Unfortunately, the legislature continues to lag behind the courts in
spirit. While several statutes were amended in an effort to prevent injustices,
several long outstanding problems remain to be resolved by legislative
actions. For example, legislation regarding the appointment of adminis-
trators C.T.A. still remains uncertain as previously discussed.6 The effect
of wrongful conduct upon the rights of inheritance should also be determined
by legislation. The creation of a complete relationship between adopting
parents and adopted child would constitute a progressive step in the right
direction.
LEGISLATION
One of the most significant changes made by the legislature was with
reference to charitable devises and bequests. Prior to 1957, 7 all devises
and bequests to charity executed within six months of the testator's death
could be avoided by the surviving spouse, lineal descendants or adopted
child. However, by virtue of amendment, institutions of higher learning
were exempted from the operation of the statute.
Additional legislative enactments bar dower unless applied for within
nine months after first notice to creditors or three years after death,8 require
*Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law.
1. Wadlington v. Edwards, 92 So.2d 629 (Fla. 1957).
2. Morganthaler v. First Atlantic Nat'l Bank, 80 So.2d 446 (Fla. 1955).
3. FLA. STAT. § 2.01 (1957).
4. Lopez v. Lopez, 96 So.2d 463 (Fla. 1957).
5. Revell v. Crews, 97 So.2d 336 (Fla. 1957).
6. Thomas and Maxey, Appointment of Administrator C. T. A. in Florida, 11
MIAMI L.Q 396 (1957).7.1FA. STAT. § 731.19 1957).
8. FLA. STAT. § 731.35 ( 19 57g.
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the county judge to mail a copy of creditor's claim to be supplied by the
creditor to the personal representatives;? establish the state's attorney as
the representative of all unknown or unascertainable beneficiaries in all
proceedings involving charitable trusts;10 require all agreements to make a
will or to give a legacy or make a devise to be in writing and signed by the
party whose estate is to be changed in the presence of two subscribing
witnesses;" and exempt personal representatives, whether individual or
corporation, from personal liability unless suit is brought within one year
from the date of discharge.
12
DECISIONS
CONTRACT 'ro MAKE A Wis
Generally, a contract to make a will is regarded as non testamentary
in character and need not be executed in accordance with the Statute of
Wills. Its essential validity is determined by the law of contracts. Thus
it is agreed that the terms of such agreement must be certain as in the
case of other contracts.':' However, in this respect courts are considerably
lenient in determining the requisite certainty. Agreements to will the
pronisee enough so that she would not be obliged to work have been
sustained. 4 Similarly, agreements to provide by will a sufficient amount to
permit the promisee to live in comfort as theretofore enjoyed have also
been upheld." Florida courts have subscribed to this leniency as evidenced
by the case of the First Atlantic National Bank of Daytona Beach v.
Cobbett,'0 wherein it was held that an agreement by the testator to make
such provision for the plaintiff in his will as would be sufficient to provide
for her financial needs for the rest of her life was valid and enforceable.
It is further agreed that contracts to make a will are not within the
Statute of Frauds if applied to personalty" However, by the great weight
of authority, contracts to devise realty must comply with the Statute of
Frauds requirements.' 8
Prior to 1957, the Florida courts recognized oral agreements to make
a will where the subject matter involved was personalty.'0 However, in that
year, the Florida Legislature provided 20 that all agrcements to make a will
must be signed in the presence of two subscribing witnesses to be binding
and enforceable.
9. FLA. STAT. § 733.16 (1957).
10. FLA. STAT. § 737.251 (1957).
11. FLA. STAT. § 731.051 (1957)
12. FLA. STAT. § 734.35 (1957).
13. Richardson v. Cade, 150 Ca. 535, 104 S.E. 207 (1920).
14. Thompson v. Stevens, 71 Pa. 161 (1872).
15. Thompson v. Tucker-Osborne, Ill Mich. 470, 69 N.W. 730 (1897).
16. 82 So.2d 87 (Fla. 1955).
17. Hull v. Thomas, 82 Conn. 647, 73 Lah. 925 (1910).
18. Allen v. Bromberg, 153 Ala. 620, 50 So.884 (1909).
19. See note 4 supra.
20. FLA. STAT. § 731.051 (1957).
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RESULTING TRUST
A resulting trust has been defined as one which arises when the legal
estate in property is disposed of, conveycd or transferred under circumstances
which indicate that the beneficial interest is to follow or be enjoyed with
the legal title?
1
The circumstances giving rise to the creation of a resulting trust ait:
(1) when an attempt to create an express trust fails, (2) when the purpose
of an express trust has been fulfilled and no provision has been made for
disposition of the remainder, (3) when one person pays the consideration
for property and has title taken in the name of another under circumstances
which indicate no gift was intended. This latter type is by far the most
important class of resulting trusts and is referred to generally as a purchase
money trust.
For its creation, it is necessary that a complainant allege and prove
that he paid a specific sum for a distinct interest in or aliquot part of the
land or that he obligated himself by agreement to pay at the time of the
conveyance. -2 2 Any agreement to pay executed subsequent to the vesting
of title is sufficient.2
3
SATISFACTION
According to the majority view, a legacy to a creditor of the testator
which is equal to or greater in amount than the indebtedness will be pre-
suned to have been intended as a satisfaction of the debt.24 In the absence
of evidence showing a contrary intent on the part of the testator, the
creditor is obligated to elect to either accept the legacy or proceed to recover
his claim against the executor. The majority view has been criticized25 and
is held inapplicable under the following circumstances:
(1) when the legacy and debt are of a different nature.
(2) when the will contains an express direction for the payment of the
testator's debts.
(3) when the debt is unliquidated.
(4) when the debt is owed by the testator as a trustee or other
representative capacity.
As a result of dissatisfaction with the majority rule and the exceptions
attached to it by the courts in an effort to prevent injustices based upon
a speculation of the testator's intent, a modern rule has been formulated
21. Paramore v. Hampton, 55 Fla. 672, 45 So.992 (1908); Rosenthal v. Largo
Land Co., 146 Fla. 81, 200 So.233 (1941); Womack v. Madison Drug Co., 155 Fla. 335,
20 So.2d 256 (1944).
22. Revell v. Crews, 97 So.2d 336 (Fla. 1957).
23. Sorrells v. McNally, 89 Fla. 457, 105 So.106 (1925); Fox v. Kimball, 92 Fla.
401, 109 So.46S (1926); Walker v. Landress, Ill Fla. 356, 149 So.545 (1933).
24. In re Steinkraus' Estate, 233 Wis. 186, 288 N.W. 772 (1939). See Note, 25
MINN,. L. REv. 122 (1940).
25. Milheran's Executors v. Gillespie, 12 Wend. 349 (N.Y. 1834).
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to which Florida subscribes. 28  According to this rule, no presumption is
indulged that a legacy is in satisfaction of an indebtedness due the legatee.
To bring about such a result, the testator must manifest his intent to
that effect in the will.
This modern rule appears to be the most equitable and rational. Why
speculate as to a testator's intent to the possible detriment of others and
possibly in violation of the Statute of Wills? Further, why adhere to a
rule which has been cluttered, complicated and rendered ineffective by
virtue of several exceptions deemed necessary to prevent inequities?
CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS
In construing wills, courts generally apply the cardinal rule that
the intent of the testator shall prevail.27 Although this rule is meritorious
and worthy of continued application, it is subject to practical limitations.
For example, courts are of course required to hold that they will not compel
an executor to perform an act which would be entirely nugatory.28 In addi-
tion, by virtue of legislative mandate generally imposed, courts are bound
by the law in force in England on July 4, 1776, except as changed by
statute or constitution.
23
The foregoing rule together with its limitations was interpreted by
the Florida Supreme Court for the first time in the case of Morgenthaler,
Jr. et al v. First Atlantic National Bank of Daytona Beach.30 The testatrix
devised the residue of her estate to trustees whom she directed to purchase
annuities assuring designated beneficiaries an income for life. The bene-
ficiaries sought to obtain the corpus of the estate in lieu of the annuity,
contending that they were the absolute owners of the corpus and conse-
quently could dispose of it in any manner they desired. This contention
was based upon the English rule that a bequest of money to be used in
the purchase of an annuity gives the legatee a right to the money and he
can insist that the annuity shall not be purchased. Apparently, this English
rule, first adopted in 1725,1 derived justification from the fact that an annuity
in England could be sold by the beneficiary without loss or sacrifice. Con-
sequently, a beneficiary of an annuity should not be required to accept a
res which he could immediately convert. in other words, an executor
should not be obligated to purchase an annuity against the desire of the
beneficiary, since the beneficiary could immediately sell it and obtain the
corpus.
26. Lopez v. Lopez, 96 So,2d 463 (Fla. 1957).
27. Ili determining the testator's intent, it is proper to consider all circumstances
surrounding the execution of the will, the condition, nature and extent of the property
devised, the testator's relationship and attitudes towards the members of his family and to
the beneficiaries of the will, their financial condition and in general the relationship of all
parties. Pancoast v. Pancoast, 97 So.2d 875 (Fla. 1957).
28, Gilbert v. Findlay College, 195 Md. 508, 74 A.2d 36 (1950).
29. FLA. STAT, c. 201 (1957).
30. 80 So.ld 446 (Fla. 1955).
31. Yates v. Compton, 2 P. Wins, 308 (1725).
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The beneficiaries further contended that since the English rule from
1725 to date is consistent with their contention, the court has no alternative
but to adopt it by virtue of the Florida Statute adopting the common law
in force on July 4, 1776.32
In denouncing this contention, the court held to the effect that the
common law will be given forced effect so long as it is not contrary to our
modern conditions and circumstances and that since an annuity according
to modern concepts is very different from corpus, the intent of the testator
must be given effect. In order to properly carry out this intent, the trustees
must purchase an annuity on behalf of the beneficiaries and must provide
by contract that the beneficiaries will not be permitted to sell, mortgage,
transfer, hypothecate or otherwise deal with the annuity in a manner
inconsistent with the testatrix's intent.
This opinion is quite interesting in two respects: (1) The Florida
Supreme Court has again acknowledged that the common law rules in
effect on July 4, 1776 must give way not only to inconsistent statutes and
constitutional provisions, but also to "modern ways." The effect of this
holding is to render the statute adopting the common law a nullity. (2)
The court implied restraints upon alienation, both voluntary and involuntary,
which are normally discouraged because of adverse effects upon commercial
transactions. Thus we find the supreme court placing greater emphasis upon




The Florida statutes relative to the appointment of administrators
of decedent's estates are typical of those enacted by other states in so far
as they establish an order of preference based upon relationship to the
intestate.33 According to the Florida statutes, first preference is given
to the surviving spouse; however, in the event such spouse fails, refuses or
is incapable of acting as administrator, then to the next of kin. In the
event a person entitled to preference fails to apply for letters of administra-
tion, the county judge is authorized to appoint a qualified person not
associated with his office. However, before the county judge is empowered
to issue letters of administration to a person not entitled to preference,
he must issue citation to all known persons entitled to preference over the
person applying unless such persons waived their right to act in writing.
This holding was clearly and unequivocally demonstrated in the case of
Estate of Bush.34 In that case, the intestate left surviving a brother and
eleven nieces and nephews, all of whom were non-residents of the State
32. See note 22, supra.
33. FLA. STAT. §§ 732.44(1)(2) (1957).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
of Florida. Nine and one-half months after the intestate's death, one of
her alleged creditors filed a petition requesting that her attorney be ap-
pointed administrator of the estate. Although citation was not served on
the intestate's brother, the county judge issued letters of administration in
favor of the alleged creditor's attorney. Thereafter, the intestate's brother
filed a petition for revocation of the letters. In sustaining the petition for
revocation of letters, the supreme court established two propositions not
previously determined:
(1) The statute establishing the procedural requirements for the
issuance of letters of administration ' must first be met before the statute
relating to preference becomes effective,
(2) The right of parties for letters are determined at the time the
petition is filed and are not affected by waivers subsequently issued.
Totten Trust
It is generally agreed that a deposit in trust for the benefit of another
does not alone create an irrevocable trust.3 The reason for this holding is
the lack of a genuine trust intent.37 The depositor may have intended
to create no trust, but rather to conceal his true asset or to avoid a bank
rule limiting the size of individual accounts. lie may have intended to
create a trust in the future or to create a present trust subject to the power
to revoke.
The leading American case involving bank account trusts, In re Totten's
Estate,3 18 announced the doctrine 39 which was subscribed to completely
and unequivocally by the Florida Supreme Court in deciding the case of
Seymour v. Seymour:'4
A deposit by one person of his own money in his own name as
trustee for another, standing alone, does not establish an irrevocable
trust during the lifetime of the depositor. It is a tentative trust
merely, revocable at will, until the depositor dies or completes the
gift in his lifetime by some unequivocal act or declaration, such as
delivery of the passbook or notice to the beneficiary. In case the
depositor dies before the beneficiary without revocation or some
decisive act or declaration of disaffirmance, the presumption arises
that an absolute trust was created as to the balance on hand at the
death of the depositor.
Factually, the Seymour case was typical of a bank account trust. S
opened a savings account with the signature providing "S in trust for X."
34. 80 So.2d 673 (Fla. 1955).
35. FLA. STAT. § 732.43 (1957).
36. Beaver v. Beaver, 117 N.Y. 421, 22 N.E. 940 (1889).
37. Ibid.
38. 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904),
39. Id. at 752.
40. 85 So.Zd 726 (Fla. 1956).
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S made deposits and withdrawals during her lifetime and at her death,
$2,055.34 remained in the account. In holding that X was entitled to the
balance in the account, the supreme court adhered to the Totten trust
doctrine in lieu of going behind it to consider whether retention of the
power to make withdrawals is analogous to retention of dominion and
control over the trust res. If the analogy is present, how can one contend
a valid inter vivos trust was created? If there is no analogy, how can
dominion and control be exercised over a bank account except through
reservation of the power to make withdrawals?
Constructive Trust
The distinction between a resulting and constructive trust in principle
is simple; however, in practical application considerable confusion has
needlessly developed. A resulting trust is based upon an inferred or presumed
intent that it shall exist. A constructive trust is a remedial device created
by a court of equity irrespective of intent for the purpose of preventing
fraud or unjust enrichment.
4'
The type of confusion frequently created is illustrated by the case of
Wadlington v. Edwards,42 Appellant alleged that she paid the purchase price
for her homestead out of her separate estate; however, title was taken in the
name of her husband without her knowledge or consent. Her husband died
on March 21, 1935, and through her own admission, the appellant knew
of the alleged fraud a few days prior to her husband's death and waited
until October 20, 1955, to bring an action. By her complaint, the appellant
sought the creation of a constructive trust; however, by her brief on appeal
she sought a resulting trust. The type of trust involved was quite material
in the case in order to determine the applicable statute of limitations.
Generally, in the case of a resulting trust, the statute of limitations
does not affect the beneficiary's interest until the beneficiary knows or
should know of the trustee's repudiation. In the case of a constructive
trust, the prevailing view applies the statute of limitations from the date
the beneficiary knows or should have known of the facts on which a construc-
tive trust could be based.
43
On appeal, the appellant contended that since her husband did not
assert a right antagonistic to hers, the statute of limitations did not bar
her recovery. In denying the appellant relief, the supreme court deviated
from the prevailing view by holding that the statute of limitations does
not apply to constructive trusts. Instead, the doctrine of laches applies,
which a court of equity will apply consistent with the appropriate statute
41. Canova v. Corran, 92 So.2d 614 (Fla. 1957); Armenian Hotel Owners, Inc. v.
Ilulhonjeans, 96 So.2d 146 (Fla. 1957); Roberts v. Roberts, 84 So.2d 717 (Fla. 1956).
42. 92 So.2d 629 (fla. 1957).
43. 'ride v. Pak, 135 Ala. 131, 33 So.175 (1902); Holloway v. Eagle, 135 Ark 206,
205 S.W. 113 (1918); Hudson v. Cahoon, 193 Mo. 547, 91 S.W. 72 (1906); In re
Marshall's Estate, 138 Pa. 285, 22a24 (1890).
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of limitations in the absence of intervening equities. The purpose for the
holding was to afford the court greater flexibility in granting relief by
constructive trust. If it held the statute of limitations applicable, it would
have had no alternative but to apply it in every instance irrespective of the
equities involved between the parties. Under the present state of the law
in Florida, courts are free to consider intervening equities irrespective of
the time lapse in all cases involving constructive trusts.
Removal of Trustee
Although a court of equity has the inherent right to remove a trustee
and to appoint a successor, it is reluctant to do so for two very authentic
reasons: (1) Removal inevitably has a discrediting effect upon a trustee's
reputation. (2) If the trustee was appointed by the settlor, his removal is
necessarily contrary to the settlor's intent.
Consequently, before a court of equity will order removal, there must
be a clear showing that the financial interests of the cestuis will be seriously
impaired if the trustee continued to administer the estate.
Thus, where testamentary trustees were authorized to conduct testator's
business until properties could be disposed of advantageously, the fact that
the trustees handled the estate for eleven years without disposing of the
estate did not alone constitute grounds for removal. 44
Miscellaneous
In addition to the foregoing, the Florida courts have considered a
variety of problems involving trusts and succession which are worthy of note.
For example, it has been determined, consistent with the prevailing view,
that a gift made by will to named beneficiaries creates a presumption that
no class gift was intended.4 A case48 dealing with the problem of mental
capacity to execute a will held that mental capacity at the time of the
will's execution could be established either by direct proof or inferences
in the light of circumstances existing before and after the will's execution.
The nature of the disposition, if unnatural, is also material and can be
considered. Additional cases held to the effect that a wife's dower right
was not subject to her husband's debts; 47 no relief can be granted for
mistake in the inducement while executing a will;48 and that a wife's claim
against her husband's estate arising out of a separation and trust agreement
executed prior to divorce of the parties must be filed within eight months
as provided by statute49 or it will be barred.50
44. Powell v. Cocowitch, 94 So.2d 589 (Fla. 1957).
45. Ettzeroths' Estate v. Ettzeroth, 83 So.2d 772 (Fla. 1955).
46. Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 84 So.2d 560 (Fla. 1956).
47. In re Estate of Poyne, 83 So.2d 109 (Fla. 1955).
48. Forsythe v. Sprelberger, 86 So.2d 427 (Fla. 1956).
49. FLA. STAT. § 733.16 (1957).
50. Van Sciver v. First Natl Bank, 88 So.2d 912 (Fla. 1956).
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